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Social Decision-Making under Scientific Controversy, 
Expertise, and the Precautionary Principle 
 
Olivier GODARD* 
 
Abstract 
Integrating scientific inputs into the regulatory process is generally attributed to 
experts. But, environmental issues are often characterised by an all-pervasive uncertainty and 
scientific and social controversies which make the experts' task difficult. This paper presents 
the concept of social decision-making under scientific controversy and comes to an 
examination of the implicit but decisive roles expected from expertise in those contexts. It 
also gives some examples of misunderstandings about the very nature of scientific statements. 
Since a new principle, the Precautionary Principle, is said to bring appropriate responses to 
uncertainty, we examine the change in the course of relationship between science and 
decision-making it may have and we test its operational capability to solve decision problems 
on a scientific basis. Our conclusion is that in controversial contexts, the Principle has no 
definite content and is not able to frame a scientifically determined hierarchy of options. So, to 
have it reasonably translated to deal with practical matters, some effort is expected from 
scientific communities : they should organise a collective validation of their expertise, distinct 
from the organisation of expertise by public administrations. This expertise by scientists 
should consider with due attention the process of formulation of assumptions and building 
conjectural possibilities, so as to define the boundaries of relevance for action and to establish 
some gradual scale in the qualification of scientific products which may authorise gradual 
precautionary measures to be taken. 
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Introduction 
Among environmental issues, some are condemned to remain in a scientifically 
controversial, non-stabilised state of knowledge for a long period of time. Because of threats 
of possible, large, and irreversible damage, some of them have nevertheless been placed on 
the public agenda, without waiting for a stabilisation of knowledge. Groups of experts have 
been committed to elucidate if any action should be taken, which one and when it should be. 
On the basis of their advice and reports, some decisions have been taken nationally or even 
internationally. As a matter of fact, in public presentations and debates, decisions to act or not 
to act have been quite frequently said to be based on scientific evidence, as if science was 
unambiguously forcing action in some way, even in controversial context. And more often 
that not, the storytellers of exemplary cases do not avoid becoming "revisionists" in their way 
to develop a linear and rational story full of hard facts, scientific evidence and policy 
responses coming in due time, in the place of a confuse process showing strange sequences 
where, for example, decisions are taken before the events which are supposed to explain them. 
To which extent this image of a science-based decision-making process can be hold to be true 
is very questionable in several recent cases.1 
This is not to deny any role to science or experts. But it has to be looked at which roles 
exactly have been played in these cases. Science is an ingredient, but within the holes and 
shadows of science, we find choices and approximations typical of some social framing of 
issues. The role seemingly tacitly expected from experts is not just to be the spokesmen of 
objective qualities of natural or technical systems. Which one is a first topic of this paper. 
Beyond answers to this first question, it seems more and more difficult to separate the 
logic of knowledge from the one of action : in scientifically controversial contexts, science is 
invested by different types of strategic use for the benefit of political projects or economic 
interests. It is in this context that a new principle has recently emerged in the rhetoric of 
justification as a response to uncertainty and controversies, the "Precautionary Principle". It 
first began to be incorporated in soft law and is now in the phase of trying to be translated into 
operational and binding rules. But what sort of change can we expect to observe in the 
relationships of decision-making with science ? This will be a second topic of this paper. 
Throughout this contribution, our ambition is to draw the attention to some stylised 
facts that may affect the common perception of the role of scientists and experts in public 
decision-making. The empirical basis will be extracted mainly from regional and global 
environmental cases : forest decay in Europe, ozone depletion, global warming. 
 
                                                 
1.- On this general issue of science, expertise and decision-making, see for instance R. Smith and B. Wynne 
(1991) and GERMES (1991, 1992). 
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1. Decision-making under scientific controversy : variables and stylised facts 
 
A classical way of looking at the regulatory process assumes a stabilised social and 
material (technical and natural) world, and an appropriate knowledge. Experts are supposed to 
have the key role for identifying the real problems to be resolved and the range of solutions it 
will be rational to put into practice. By following these competent recommendations, political 
decision-makers will just confirm their general attachment to public good and general interest, 
defined through general principles (justice,...) and aims (preserving public health,...). Quite 
understandably, conflicts may happen, but these conflicts only involve contradictory interests 
emerging from a common knowledge background about possible states of the world and 
causal relationships ; these are conflicts resulting from divergent projects or, very simply, 
distributive conflicts. Real-life cases are not so clear-cut. Not only uncertainties are often 
pervasive as regards matters targeted by new regulatory efforts, but the context is also non 
stabilised as regards the social actors or interests of concern. By contrast, we suggest to 
consider an ideal class of problems, named 'controversial risks' (Godard, 1992b, 1993b). 
 
Four characteristic variables of controversial risks' 
The ideal class of "controversial risks", as opposed to various forms of regular risks 
commonly addressed by insurance activities, is proposed to be characterised by the position of 
four variables : 
• A predominance of the scientific and social construction of issues on direct perception by 
people (who has ever heard about the stratospheric ozone layer before some scientists say 
it will be depleted by human actions such as Supersonic flights or CFCs' emissions, 
resulting in additional skin cancers ?) ; lay-people cannot have a judgement on these issues 
but through the social process of issue building and communication involving scientists, 
public administration, social groups devoted to some cause (green ONGs, for example) 
and the media. 
• Interests of third parties absent from the social scene (foreign countries, future 
generations, natural species if they are recognised rights for their own sake), or of non-
reducible forms of collective concerns, being said relevant, at least by some influential 
actors ; such interests are asked to be taken into account through explicit and specific 
forms in the decision-process ; so public debates involve at the same time various and 
competing people claiming to be the spokesmen of absent third parties interests, and of 
people speaking for actual, "here and there", groups of interests. This hybrid composition 
certainly adds to the complexity, if not confusion, of debates and to the difficulty of 
resolving the problem of coming up to a justified decision ; for instance an economic 
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analysis based on methods for revealing individual preferences of existing people (such as 
contingent valuation) may have to be combined with ethical discussions about the possible 
rights of future generations. 
• A long-lasting controversial state of scientific knowledge on critical parts of the problem 
relevant for policy-making (causation chains, consequences for human activities and 
welfare, time profile of expected changes...) ; not only are there several contradictory 
explanations and theories coexisting at one given moment, but there is also a dynamic of 
changing equilibrium between these theories, and of emerging new views changing the 
whole landscape, as regards the process of causal imputation. Depending on when 
decision-makers decide to do something about it, they will not focus on the same causes... 
To take one example, it will suffice to recall that the whole ozone story began in the 
seventies by an attack against Supersonic flights, said by some scientists in the US. as 
depleting the ozone layer. Twenty years later, the current scientific view is that these 
flights, at the altitude at which they would have been achieved, would have contributed to 
increase ozone density... 
• Notably because of potential irreversibility, a perception at least by some social actors, 
that the problem is a major stake, touching questions such as political or national security, 
public health, historical or cultural identity, group survival, or general conditions of life 
enhancement on earth, and so deserving immediate and strong action, without waiting for 
the very momentum of certitude. The rational view, i.e. "learn first, then act" has to be 
partially reversed into "act first, then learn". But on which base are decision-makers going 
to decide, and what can be the role of experts in that case ? 
 
Global environmental risks such as the ozone layer case or global warming, clearly 
belong to the latter class, but they are not the only ones : hazardous substances or emissions 
possibly generating threats for human health stand in the same class. In these controversial 
contexts, economic and social interest and strategies have taken a significant part in the 
process of building a new institutional and regulatory landscape. They have done it, not only 
through traditional forms of lobbying but also by investing the domain of science and 
expertise. So reconsidering the role of experts in the management of controversial risks seems 
to be of interest to elucidate the social processes combined in those contexts. 
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The regulatory process as part of a self-organisational, self-referent, socio-economic 
process 
Unfortunately or not, what can be observed does not fit with the conditions of 
relevance of the pure economic model of substantive rationality, which poses full knowledge 
(deterministic or probabilistic) as a condition of rational action, rational regulations, in this 
case. Here, actions chosen will interplay with the process of opening and closure of possible 
courses of evolution (in technical terms, states of nature and actions are not independent). 
Two variables have a key role to this regard : a) technological progress, which has to be seen 
as a socially endogenous process depending on social rules and strategies of actors and so, on 
social values and expectations about the future ; b) timing of processes : a sharp change of 
environmental conditions may forbid any evolutionary process of ecosystems ; a slow change 
may not be disruptive. So the idea of founding decision on a consistent and independent 
reality has to be substituted by a broader view of the regulatory process as a self-
organisational, self-referent socio-economic process in which representations and realities are 
condemned to be intertwined, inducing a process which can be seen at the same time as 
producing the reality and learning from this new reality through an interpretation of the signals 
that real changes seem to give. 
Turning this view in economic terms, we should learn to add to the standard statement 
that, for example, "one technology has been chosen because it was the most profitable one", 
the complementary view that "this technology became profitable because it has been chosen 
first", i.e. being made credible by persuasive stakeholders, this technology has attracted an 
important flow of economic resources to increase its initial productivity and to organise the 
economic and institutional space2 so as to get the best from it. It is true that every story of this 
type does not turn out to be a success ; economic and technological development cannot be 
understood just as automatic self-fulfilling prophecies. There may be physical limitations or 
obstacles on the road ; a contradiction between the time-scale of the period of investment 
needed (how long is it necessary to invest before having an operational and competitive 
technology ?) and the time-horizon of investors may emerge, depending on predominant 
models of economic organisation, and so on. 
Keeping the same idea when looking at the dynamics of emerging new regulations 
(Seveso directive, new insurance arrangements for accidental pollution of seas, ...), we should 
add to the view of the regulatory process as a response to critical events a complementary 
understanding in which some social actors and groups are strategically using events as a 
                                                 
2.- Laurent Thévenot (1985) has introduced the concept of "investment in forms" to embrace types of 
investments required to establish and maintain some new forms of organisations and conventions, implying the 
constitution and stabilisation of networks of actors whose behaviour is to be aligned ; examples are the 
development of new types of accounting (think of the challenge of setting environmental accounts) and audits, a 
framework for collective negotiations, a branch business organisation, ... 
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resource to achieve their projects or, more frequently, to advance some steps towards this 
achievement. In that case, the course of evolution, apparently obeying to contingent events, 
should be looked at as the progressive achievement of some leading purpose connected to 
some leading "vision of the world". This is the reason why some events, though catastrophic, 
remain meaningless for the evolution of institutions and rules, and others, maybe scaled at a 
lower rate as regards magnitude, may have a critical influence on the process of change. 
 
A set of stylised facts for a descriptive model 
It is useful to typify some of the facts we can observe in the social process of decision-
making under scientific controversy. This way, we may contribute to the modelling of the way 
this class of controversial risks is tackled. 
 
Scientific warnings being sent in spite of a non-stabilised state of basic knowledge 
Some scientists are launching warnings to public authorities and opinion against 
possible current and future detrimental trends of evolution and threats affecting the 
biophysical environment (atmosphere, forests, biodiversity, ...) or public health ; they are 
presented as potentially very damaging and implying human responsibility, either directly 
because the involved phenomena result from human activities, or indirectly because man has 
the technical capability to change the course of things. This dimension of responsibility is 
critical : to which extent may the observed phenomena be said 'natural' or attributable to 
human activities?3 If some human responsibility is involved, sharp debates are occurring 
about its attribution. So in the greenhouse gases issue, hard discussions took place, dealing 
with the level of deforestation and the burning of the Amazonian forest, or the methods used 
for calculations of emissions from various countries. 
Another point of interest is that standard prerequisites of probabilities calculations 
cannot be satisfied in the class of risks here considered, since 'states of the world' are not 
whole well-identified (depending on actions, for a part), do not belong to the same basic 
worlds and their list is continuously changing. 
 
                                                 
3.- How far global warming is related to natural variability or changes ? How far the ozone hole is a periodic 
natural phenomenon which was simply unknown before its discovery ? How far the general forests decline in 
Germany in the eighties can be viewed as a time-lagged effect of severe droughts having hit Europe in the 
seventies ? 
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The jump of scientific controversies onto the public agenda 
Up to that point, the very existence of scientific controversies is just quite a normal 
course of scientific affairs. But scientific debates used to concern only a relatively close 
scientific community and to be conducted along specific professional procedures and rules. 
What seems typical of the recent period, some scientific controversies are now rapidly coming 
on the public agenda through a large impact in the media, before being closed on the scientific 
ground. This arises when, through receptive media, some specific events give a striking and 
perceptible 'face' to phenomena - severe droughts, the Antarctic ozone hole, trees losing leaves 
or needles, several people seen in hospitals or reported to be died because of some illness 
related to hazardous substances. Suddenly a lot of people, opinion groups, politicians and 
economic actors realise that something is going on, which may affect them. Moreover, the 
plurality of competing scientific theories proposed involve many more interests groups than a 
well-defined, limited issue. 
This shift from the scientific field to the political arena is not a simple and transparent 
one. It implies a translation of experimental facts, models, theories, assumptions and 
contingencies into the universe of concerns, interests and values. It is a critical moment, with 
two tendencies operating : some actors or groups try to dress interests and strategies with 
scientific arguments for giving them the strength and authority of science ; others suspect any 
scientific result or assessment to shelter some hidden vested interests. Institutionalised 
expertise is one of the main channel through which this process of translation is achieved, and 
we will have to consider the roles they are given in this operation. This exercise can be 
exposed to various sorts of criticism. Questions are raised about the type of legitimacy experts 
groups can rightly mobilise or about the composition of such groups : who are the people 
being said experts ? 
One typical and famous controversy about experts conclusions accused to hide 
political and economic interests is the severe controversy that arose between the Centre for 
Science and Environment (New Delhi) and the World Resources Institute (Washington DC) in 
the global warming case. Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain (1991) attacked the results and 
methodology of the study realised by the latter, which notably gave figures for net emissions 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) of each country on the basis of one implicit assumption, i.e. that 
the carrying capacity of the global environment as regards absorption of GHGs emissions is 
"naturally" allocated to countries on the basis of their present level of emissions. With other 
rules, more appealing to Third world countries, which allocate this global "service" to 
countries on a per capita basis, it is shown that the responsibility of developing countries may 
not be superior to 20 % instead of the nearly 50 % found in the WRI's study.  
The importance of expertise in this phase should not be underestimated since some 
scholars (Haas, 1990) give a key role to the uprising of an international 'epistemic community' 
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for setting up a new regime of international co-ordination.4 But in the context of controversial 
risks, there presumably are several epistemic communities in competition. 
 
A widespread feeling of urgency and a pressure for acting before knowing 
The potential gravity and irreversibility of imagined consequences of phenomena lead 
at least some experts, opinion groups or public and private managers to consider it necessary 
to act without waiting for scientists to fully elucidate the main questions. There is a 
widespread feeling of urgency and the sudden awareness that action needs to be taken before a 
sufficient knowledge has been reached. But in those cases, action cannot be rational in the 
classical substantive meaning, i.e. founded on "hard facts" (stabilised knowledge within the 
scientific community) and on precise cost-benefit analyses. 
It is possible that decision-makers find some benefit to dress up the actual process of 
decision as if it were following a pure rational process. That sort of theatre is often what is 
expected from experts : to give an illusion of rationality and of scientific incontestability in 
order to maximise the authoritative value of decisions already taken. 
The pressure of the feeling of urgency opens up the Pandora's box of temptations of 
manipulating science for the benefit of political and economic interests. Concerned social 
actors and big corporations significantly involved in R & D activities are spreading their 
strategic field of action and competition to the scientific representations of the world (nature, 
but also society). The content and timing of action is at stake : some want immediate action 
based on technological standards, in order to push new markets ; others try to postpone any 
action to preserve their own business,5 and so on.6 In the field of science, the purpose of this 
strategic action may be as well to obtain a premature and favourable closure of the 
controversy, as an artificially sustained state of controversy, since persisting uncertainty and 
doubt permit lobbying to continue. More often than not, actors are making an argument of the 
                                                 
4.- An 'epistemic community' is understood to be a network or community of 'experts' sharing beliefs in causal 
relationships (even if these beliefs turn out to be wrong) and values about what public action should look like. It 
is supporting a 'vision of the world', and takes place at the interface of scientific community and social and 
political arenas. Such 'epistemic communities' operate as "translators" between science and social concerns in 
both directions. Not everybody agrees with the role given to "epistemic communities". Other scholars prefer to 
keep an interest-based explanation (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994). 
5.- In the ozone case, an Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy was established in 1980 with the initial 
purpose to oppose regulation of CFCs and support scientists who disagreed with the new theory of F. Rowland 
and M. Molina first published in a Nature's article in June 1974. 
6.- P. Roqueplo (1988), when comparing France and FRG as regards the forests dying-back issue, suggested the 
concept of "reversed threat' to describe the fact that for French industrialists (car manufacturers, oil companies, 
coal industry), the threat was not coming from the forests disease, but from the decisions of the FRG's 
government and the European Community's Commission about car emissions, lead-free gasoline and S02 
emissions from power plants. This does not mean that French industrialists were a priori more insensitive than the 
German ones to environmental considerations, but that the content of regulations was perceived as unduly 
favourable to the German technology and reflecting mainly German conditions and priorities. 
O. Godard - Scientific controversy, expertise and precaution -  - 9 - 
state of uncertainty and controversies to postpone any policy change or new decision. So 
experts judgements tend to become the instruments of social actors' strategies, even if these 
experts do not take part consciously to this game. In the meanwhile, some scientists, as 
individuals or as interests groups, are accepting to dress with the new clothes of advocacy, 
with the hope of gaining some financing for their research7 or simply for various ideological 
motives. Even if experts maintain their independence, their social credibility is generally 
affected, and any statement is from there on suspected to hide specific interests. Then, 
common people, but also official circles, are keen to believe in statements, not for their 
scientific value, unfortunately indiscernible, but according to the degree of convergence with 
their a priori attitudes. 
 
A competition game for rule-setting, which comes to an indirectly arbitration of scientific 
truth for economic and political motives 
In controversial contexts made of several competing explanations of basic phenomena 
of concern, actors have an opportunity to influence the ultimate course of public action by 
pushing the 'vision of the world' most suitable to their interests. On the winning 'vision of the 
world' will depend the possibilities of development of technologies, markets, and the ensuing 
comparative advantages that some firms may gain nationally or internationally. So there is a 
competition for the guidance of public action. Groups of experts have a key position in this 
game, mainly through their composition. This is not to say that every individual position can 
be reduced to narrowly defined economic interests ; but that legitimate economic and non-
economic interests take part in the process resulting in setting-up the positions of experts.8 
At one moment, this competition leads to some decisions and policies. The specific 
meaning of those decisions and policies deserves to be stressed. In targeting and reorganising 
specific economic fields (by changing incentives, or by defining new technological 
requirements for emissions of pollutants), the action of public authorities will come practically 
to an indirect arbitration of scientific controversies. Here, some 'vision of the world', regarding 
                                                 
7.- Applying the interest-based explanation to the behaviour of scientists when they try to attract public attention 
onto some environmental risks is the basic argument of the work of S. Boehmer-Christiansen about the various 
cases she has been studying (acid rain, global warming) (1990, 1994a et b). About the issue of climate change, 
she writes for example in the abstract of her paper : "The primary interest of research is the creation of concern in 
order to demonstrate policy relevance and attract funding". 
8.- For instance, many experts in groups created by public authorities are coming from industrial circles ; these 
persons, like those coming from other circles, combine specific competencies and a function of spokesmen of the 
circles to which they belong, i.e. they also defend specific industrial interests and diffuse the corresponding 
"visions of the world". In France, it has not been uncommon that the representatives of France in international 
negotiations about the protection of the ozone layer were in fact persons belonging to ATOCHEM, the industrial 
firm involved in the production of CFCs. 
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ecological phenomena and scenarios for future economic development, will be fixed by 
convention in laws, technical regulations, budgetary decisions and institutions.9 
In the "Waldsterben" case in West Germany, the initial issue was made of a sudden 
discovery by media and public opinion that the German forests were 'dying' fast at an 
unprecedented scale in low-polluted regions. In a first stage, SO2 was told to be the main 
cause and a growing popular discontent arose against industrial activities and thermal power 
units. But, in a second stage, the ozone hypothesis has been introduced by some scientists and 
gained quickly audience among political authorities. Early 1983, more severe regulations were 
enacted for emissions of thermal plants, and in July, the government released its first draft of a 
clean car regulation, implying the use of catalytic exhaust pipes. In both sectors, the 
Germany's strategy was to press the European Community to adopt similar rules in order to 
limit costs differences with competitors or, even better, turning potential additional costs into 
competitive advantages. To some extent, the government decided to share out the 
"Waldsterben" burden between the automobile sector and the energy one, which comes to 
having decided, among the various scientific theories, the one of the joint effect of acidity of 
soils and of the necrotic impact of ozone on leaves and needles. 
 
The eventual convergence of a dominant coalition on a conventional restraint of uncertainty 
built on available technologies and social acceptability 
If no coalition is able to definitely win, the competition contributes to extend the 
period of hesitation and instability of expectations between several possible alternative 
courses of actions. This is impairing the demand for predictability and contextual stability 
which characterises the industrial universe. There is a moment when the main actors, although 
still supporting conflicting views about what should be done, converge on a request to the 
government for a context stabilisation. This can be achieved through public regulatory action. 
Persisting uncertainty by which economic actors are suffering is then expected to be reduced 
by fixing social conventions and rules, even arbitrarily. 
On the other side, before any decision is made, the government has its credibility and 
legitimacy put into question by the very existence of an unresolved problem. At one moment, 
it has to 'do something' in order to justify the trust of the citizens and its own claim to be in 
charge of public affairs. So supply and demand for public action are matching. 
                                                 
9.- For example, some consensus has emerged from OECD experts groups about the standard of quality for 
underground water that should be adopted as a goal for management purpose : it should satisfy all the 
requirements of a drinking water. This specific convention, based on an human health perspective, was not self-
evident : it will have important consequences in terms of developing costly programmes of pollution abatement 
from non-point sources (agriculture, municipal flows of surface water,...). An ecological viewpoint would have 
led to another approach insisting upon local conditions. 
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At this very moment, contextual stabilisation cannot be deduced from 'hard facts' or 
scientific consensus. For example, if we except the 80% rate of emissions reduction requested 
for stabilising greenhouse gases concentrations in the atmosphere,10 any particular realistic 
objective of greenhouse gases emissions abatement has to be arbitrarily set as regards both the 
rate of abatement and the reference year to be adopted. Although the general acid rain case is 
much better documented, some basic arbitrary decisions are still inescapable : after a thorough 
scrutiny of the problem, David Newbery (1990) recognized not having been able to define the 
marginal damage cost functions in absolute terms and used relative proxies. In the same vein, 
Karl-Göran Mäler (1989) turned out the standard but heroic economic assumption of 
equalising the marginal damage and abatement costs into a means of deducing the damage 
cost from the present marginal abatement cost, with the justification that it reflects the current 
assessment of government preferences... 
So contextual stabilisation is generally based on the more sound elements at hand in 
the situation : available technologies that have come to an operational stage and are supported 
by a network of actors and corporations having vested interests in their development. Since 
then, the social process is gaining autonomy as regards the future evolution of the scientific 
controversy. Groups of experts have a key role in this translation of a problem-identification 
issue, based on knowledge, into a practical question of selecting one action among a set of 
possible ones. Clearly, the sorts of expertise needed for these two tasks are not the same. 
Interestingly, specialists of technology, industrial affairs, economics, policy science or 
communication will be - or should be - asked to trace the frontier of reasonable action before 
natural scientists can really give a decisive picture of what the problems are and where they 
come from. Alternatively, when the issue of reasonable action is at stake, groups from which 
advice is looked for are not only experts, but various types of formal and informal spokesmen 
of stakeholders : on them depend the acceptability of actions. 
Once institutionalised, compromises that have been reached appear to be reversible 
only with great difficulty, even if they do not fit to the future evolution of knowledge. This is 
not a physical type of irreversibility but one which is a socio-economic construct : if the new 
rules are perceived to constitute a credible commitment of authorities, investment strategies of 
all actors tend to be re-organised around them ; this fix-up of conventional decisions in 
equipment and infrastructures is an important factor of inertia and contributes to the self-
maintaining of the rules and conventions they organise (Godard & Salles, 1991). 
In the ozone case, it has been possible to phase out CFCs when industrial firms 
producing these chemicals were reasonably sure to be able to supply for substitutes. Among 
                                                 
10.- But why should we give a normative value or imperative strength to a return to a pre-industrial level of 
GHGs atmospheric concentration ? It would mean that our societies will decide to give credit to an ideology of 
natural equilibrium which, as such, is quite different from the modern scientific vision of nature insisting upon 
disequilibrium and evolution. 
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them, HCFCs had a critical position : after having been said to be a solution, inducing 
technological investments to produce these new commodities and to adapt chain of uses 
downwards, HCFCs have been discovered to be part of the problem of ozone depletion in the 
same way as CFCs, though their lifetime is shorter. So phasing out HCFCs began to be 
discussed in June 1990 in the context of the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol and 
resulted in the formulation of a goal of complete elimination of these products by 2040, such a 
deadline leaving enough time to amortise investments already made. Subsequent Amendment 
led to advance phase outs, but an agreement has been difficult to be achieved, because of the 
costs of this new change. Since the Copenhagen Amendment of November 1992, complete 
elimination is asked world-wide by 2030, and specific intermediate targets have been set up. 
In December 1994, the European Union finally reached a decision of phasing out HCFCs in 
members countries by 2015. 
The timing dimension of the period preceding hard decisions is crucial for determining 
their content. If it is a short period, the ultimate decisions will confirm available 'classical' 
technologies and block the development of innovations which need more time to come to an 
operational stage. So there will be a future opportunity cost which may be important. This was 
the conclusion of the story of the speeding-up of regulations of car emissions in Europe : they 
practically forced catalytic exhaust pipes rather than giving time for innovations in engine 
combustion. On the contrary, if this period in which no hard decisions are taken may be kept 
for a sufficiently long time and this time-lag is made predictable in advance to industrialists by 
public authorities - i.e. through official announcement of a calendar of management of the 
issue -, industrial firms receive appropriate incentive to invest in specific programmes of 
R & D, which probably will increase the chance to get better technologies at the moment 
when hard decisions are made. But, under potential irreversibility of environmental changes, 
how long is it possible to postpone action ? So the decision problem is structured by the 
respective dynamics and time constants of natural processes, progress of scientific knowledge, 
technological innovation, capital investment, opinion movements and law changes. 
 
A policy answer failing to fit exactly to either the initial or the final terms of the question 
At the end of the pipe of this social process, it is quite possible that the actions taken 
and the rules defined have only an approximate link with the initial environmental alarms that 
triggered the whole process. The singular trajectory of the process depends on the random 
order of public appearance of scientific hypotheses put forward as regards the possible 
causation of natural phenomena behind environmental issues or health hazards, and on the 
nature of the fashionable hypothesis at the moment when the government decides to do 
something about it. This moment is not decided only for scientific motives, but also for public 
opinion or political ones. If the government waits for some more time, perhaps a new 
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hypothesis appears as the most plausible explanation, and the action of authorities has then to 
be different. Generally speaking, this paradoxical conclusion may become completely clear 
only "ex post", at the end of the most active phases of the process. But, this paradox may also 
be perceived during the process to some extent. 
In the "Waldsterben" case, the initial phenomenon was coined with sudden 
awareness11 and feeling of urgency. At the end of the pipe, some actions have been taken quite 
rapidly, but these policy measures had a time-schedule unable to respond to the ecological 
dimension of the urgency felt : the only action having potentially immediate, though limited 
effect, on the NOx emissions was to fix a severe restraint on the highway speed and to reduce 
automotive traffic. But this option has been dismissed, considered as unacceptable for car 
manufacturers and users. Today, the scientific explanation of the decline of forests is still not 
clear-cut and involves a complex set of factors, among which acid rain is just one among other 
factors. As an "ex post" scientific article (Frank, 1991) puts it : “The assumption that air 
pollutants are primary causal or contributing factors is based mainly on correlations without 
rigorous proof of causality”.12 But nobody suggests to dismantle the existing set of rules for 
SO2 and NOx emissions. 
So the final answer is generally displaced as regards initial questions. For one part, it is 
because these questions have been reformulated into more relevant ones. For another part, 
because these questions could not be answered. But there is also a third aspect. The general 
challenge of policy-makers is not to resolve ecological problems or reduce health risks as 
such, but to manage political equilibria and achieve some political project. In this perspective, 
questions being raised operate as a trigger for a self-organising process of social readjustment. 
Public actions which are decided at one moment cannot really be seen as just solutions 
matching the problem as initially formulated. They address the political problems that 
environmental and health issues, as perceived by the public opinion and various sorts of 
actors, could generate. Through translations and instrumentalisation, this self-organisation 
process depends more on technological possibilities, institutional framing, and political and 
economic strategies than on a rational analysis of means to solve a well-identified ecological 
or health issue. 
                                                 
11.- P. Roqueplo (1988) explains how, after the first moment of stupor, specialists and ordinary people have 
learnt to see the symptoms of forest decline in practical situations where they did not see anything before, shifting 
suddenly their stance from denial to overemphasise. In the ozone case, after the discovery of the Antarctic ozone 
hole, scientists committed themselves to a re-analysis of all the space data, and then came to extract from these 
data significant long-term downward trends in ozone levels they have not seen previously ; see K. Warr (1990). 
12.- This author suggests that airborne halocarbons and secondary air pollutants are involved in forest decline 
through the action of derived phytotoxic compounds, as trichloroacetic acid (TCA). 
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2. The roles of experts in tackling controversial risks 
If the precedent lines of description of the context typical of controversial risks are 
accepted, we may wonder which role is expected from groups of experts commissioned by 
governments or international bodies for tackling this type of risks. Part of this role is in fact 
common with any other types of situations of expertise. This feature often leads involved 
actors not to perceive the differences. Here lies precisely one dimension of the role taken by 
experts, maintaining the illusion that controversial risks can be treated in the same rational 
framework which is supposed to be the standard of public decision-making : a model of 
"decision made by responsible public bodies guided by the general interest on the basis of a 
rigorous examination of facts and scientific evidence". 
 
Constructing a problem relevant for public action 
As such, scientific discoveries and controversies are not enough to construct the idea 
that a problem does exist and that it needs public action. So, the first role of experts is to 
construct the problem or to confirm and validate one pre-existing construction of the problem. 
This means translating a continuously changing state of knowledge, within numerous 
disciplines, into issues involving the idea of potential damage done to some relevant beings 
and, at the same time, the idea of a damage having such a cultural, political or legal relevance 
that socially protected interest were at stake. Very often, experts are not approaching the 
framing of issues through a virgin context. Policy-makers, economic actors, NGOs, others, 
have generally begun to frame issues in some ways, usually not fitting together. In this most 
frequent case, experts have to test the proposed framing and elaborate their own, on the basis 
of authority of knowledge. Quite evidently, this task may be organised practically with some 
division of labour among several committees and councils. In some case, public authorities 
give the framing and experts are only asked to fill it up with data and facts. But the point is 
that, globally, this framing activity associated to expertise is not identical to the one in which 
scientists are involved in their basic professional activity, because it implies the meticulous 
establishment of a connection between facts, data, trends and some public concerns. 
One example may be useful here. Why should we consider the disappearance of one 
species of spider to be a problem ? To answer this question, public authorities need not only 
researchers specialised in the study of spiders to give a detailed scientific picture of the 
ecology of arachnids, they also need some conceptual shaping relating the destiny of these 
animals to some social concern or value. The final result has to be expressed in terms of 
obligations, rights, damage, benefits, preservation of values, risks, and so on. To achieve this 
result, the case should be elaborated within one of the main rhetoric of legitimacy used in our 
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societies. For instance, from an industrial, productive, viewpoint generally interested by the 
exploitation of natural resources, a concern will be put forward about the possible future use 
of these animals in bioengineering and medicines and the related loss that will be suffered if 
the species disappears ; a market-oriented economist may stress that this type of spider, 
because of some specific feature, has a market value for collectors or as an ingredient in 
cooking (!) ; a conservationist ecologist will have to explain how this species is connected to 
more general features of the functions of ecosystems on which man depends, and is part of the 
natural heritage the present generation has the obligation to keep for future generations. And 
so on. 
We can observe that in the recent period, the class of relevant beings has been 
progressively extended to non human beings, as it is shown by the evolution of the meaning of 
the expression "ecological damage". Some years ago, "ecological damage" only meant damage 
done to some human persons or their property assets through an ecological channel. Now it 
frequently embraces a notion of a damage done to natural equilibria or ecosystems, without 
direct reference to human rights or properties.13 Experts coming from natural sciences have 
played an important role to diffuse this concept in legal practices. But in so doing, they were 
not acting as pure scientists, people mastering some piece of knowledge, but as social 
engineers. Which legitimacy is theirs to do so ? Not the one which is the official justification 
of their role. 
This is one typical result about the role of experts : what they are doing goes beyond 
the official justification of bringing facts and knowledge in order to enlighten an issue. 
Through repeated uses of language, a community of experts diffuses into law, administrative 
circles, and the media a specific semantic in which some normative "vision of the world and 
society" is embedded. In the case of "ecological damage", we may be soon embarked in a 
situation in which, on the one hand, regarding explicit philosophical options, statements 
supported by deep ecology are not generally accepted in most European countries, but on the 
other hand, our legal conceptions begin to be conceptually adjusted to such statements. 
 
Constructing a bundle of alternative schemes of action  
Saying there is a problem is one thing. But experts have to go further. They have to say 
how the problem can be tackled, and to come to a judgement on the practical feasibility of 
possible schemes of action. If a problem stands, but with people having no idea of possible 
                                                 
13.- For instance, the Lugano's Convention adopted by the Council of Europe (1993), dealing with rules of civil 
responsibility as regards environmental damage, establishes a distinction among damage done respectively to 
human beings, the environment, and goods. In that context "the environment" includes biotic and a-biotic natural 
resources, goods being piece of cultural inheritance, and typical features of landscape. On this, see G. Martin 
(1994). 
O. Godard - Scientific controversy, expertise and precaution -  - 16 - 
solutions, it can be said no more to be a problem. It should be called a catastrophe, a calamity, 
a drama, a fate... In the latter cases, the type of expected public behaviour cannot be described 
in the same way : the issue is just about helping or compensating victims, or delivering 
symbolic rituals to give a cultural meaning to unavoidable courses of events. So, this is one 
important task of experts to say if one emerging phenomenon is to be considered as a problem 
on which action may have significant effects, or if it is beyond any influence of public action. 
In controversial context, this is not a simple job, as we already noticed about the very debated 
global environmental changes and risks : are they natural or man-made ? 
If the problem-characterisation is confirmed by experts, the latter have to draw the 
bundle of possible actions. In fact, for so doing, experts tend to concentrate on parts of the 
issue about which causal links can be reasonably defined. In that case, the problem tend to be 
reformulated around some of its more solid segments. For example, since we do not know for 
sure that GHGs emissions are provoking a major climate change, attention will be devoted 
firstly to the link between technological and economic activities and the level of GHGs 
emissions, and secondly between GHGs emissions and GHGs atmospheric concentrations. 
Though complex, this relation is less evanescent than the one between levels of GHGs 
atmospheric concentrations and climate changes. So the initial problem "mitigating climate 
change so as to prevent a dramatic change" has been translated into "how can we stabilise 
GHGs atmospheric concentrations at some level ?". There is clearly a missing link between 
the two statements, but in spite of many efforts, scientists can do no more that give the 
uncertain, still controversial and contingent, results of modelling efforts based on numerous 
restrictive assumptions. So the gap has to be filled, but this cannot be done on a pure scientific 
basis.14 As regards economic models, we observed the same process of reduction/translation. 
According basic economic theory, we should optimise GHGs emissions so as to minimise the 
total social cost (adaptation cost plus residual environmental damage cost plus mitigation 
emission abatement cost) for all the relevant time period. In fact, with a few, very 
controversial,15 exceptions (Nordhaus, 1991), most economic exercises have been limited to 
                                                 
14. Interestingly, W. Nordhaus (1994) has recently organised an opinion survey among 22 recognised experts 
being professionally active into national or international assessment of global climate change. This poll included 
social, mainly economists, and natural scientists. Asked about the magnitude and probability of loss resulting 
from climate change as a percentage of Gross World Product (GWP) in three scenarios (3-degree-Celsius rise by 
2090, 6-degree rise by 2175, 6-degree rise by 2090) results show an enormous dispersion of estimations : for the 
less catastrophic scenario, the range goes from 0 to 21% of GWP; it is much larger in other scenarios. This 
dispersion particularly reflects disciplinary differences. Natural scientists estimates of damage are much more 
important than those of economists. One explanation quoted in the paper is that "the economists know little about 
the intricate web of natural ecosystems, whereas scientists know equally little about the incredible adaptability of 
human economies." (p. 48). 
15.- See the recent survey and discussion by P. Ekins (1995). Assumptions regarding revenue recycling, existing 
price distortions, dynamic effects on technical progress, secondary benefits, and so on, disregarded in modelling 
exercises which conclude to a high level of abatement cost, may change the whole landscape, even possibly 
turning the global warming policies into an economically profitable action, even with high levels of carbon 
taxation ! 
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an assessment of the economic cost of achieving a given level of GHGs emission abatement 
or of achieving this result through alternative means (Manne and Richels, 1991, 1993 ; 
Godard, 1993a). These operations are reflected in the way the Rio Convention on climate 
change has been framed, since the stated imperative of containing climate change to a pace 
compatible with evolution of ecosystems and preservation of natural resources has been 
translated into an imperative to stabilise GHGs emissions at their 1990 level.  
The task of structuring possible action also has an impact on the composition and 
status of groups of experts. Since public action is at stake, public authorities want to keep 
some control on the process. In the climate change case, governments having expressed their 
relative distrust towards independent self-organised groups of expertise, who have been 
responsible for putting the issue on the international public agenda in the eighties, they 
decided to create a structure of expertise they could control in connection with the UN system 
(Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994a & b) : here came the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change in 1988. IPCC was mandated to achieve a survey of the knowledge about basic 
climatology (WG1), potential impacts of climate change (WG2), assessment of response 
strategies (WG3). This panel was supposed to mobilise the authority of science and facilitate 
the emergence of a consensus on the directions to take. Its credibility highly depended on the 
large opening of cross-examination processes to numerous scientists world-wide, and on the 
fame and authority of the main scientists in charge of its management. At the same time, as an 
intergovernmental body, IPCC was submitted to some political logic : proposed members 
were designated by governments ; a concern had to be expressed for an equilibrated 
representation of each region of the world and for opening meeting sessions to some active 
NGOs, and so on. In practice, all this resulted in a mixing of very high-level scientists, some 
more modest ones, diplomats with scientific background, civil servants belonging to national 
administrations, and NGOs' advocacy. It is the functions and results of such an hybrid 
assembly we are going to consider in the following. 
 
Indirect testing of respective positions of social actors 
Groups of experts, specially in international contexts, give the opportunity to various 
social actors, mainly governments, to have a first approach of the position of others, with the 
aim to try and see what can be the borderline between what will be acceptable and 
unacceptable for the other parties. This expectation has an influence on the organisation of the 
work of experts. According to common sense, the allocation of work should be determined by 
skills and competencies. But this is not the only logic we can observe in such groups. One 
example will illustrate the process : in the first phase of activity of WG3 of IPCC, it has been 
asked to Saudi Arabia representatives to prepare the report on "Impacts of industrial countries 
policies on the world economy". The reason of this selection was not that this country had 
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specific scientific skills fitting to the subject. The intent of IPCC organisers was to avoid its 
defection and the opening of a direct conflict. The issue of introducing a carbon tax as a main 
policy instrument being very controversial to many regards (Godard, 1992c, 1993a ; 
Liberatore, 1995 ; Ekins, 1995), to give Arabia the responsibility of an assessment of the 
international economic impacts of such a measure was a means to see how far oil-producing 
countries are ready to go in their opposition to any policy changing significantly energy prices 
world-wide. Not surprisingly, the report submitted in 1992 by this country shows how much 
damaging a carbon tax will be for the economies firstly of industrial countries, secondly of 
oil-producing countries and thirdly, due to points one and two, of developing countries : the 
tax is supposed to trigger an economic crisis in the North ; this would mean less outlet for 
Third World exports ; diminished revenues returned to oil-producers would mean cuttings in 
development assistance programmes financed by these countries. The message was clear : as 
opponent to any action on energy prices oil-producer countries present themselves as the best 
spokesmen of all the developing world. But one interesting point to observe is the following : 
by accepting to play the game of expertise, one actor - in our example, Saudi Arabia - 
accepted the risks of having to argue the positions taken with all the equipment (modelling, 
statistics,...) of economics, and to be exposed to some criticism showing some deficiencies or 
inappropriate methods or ill-based results. This is the reason why we have to consider the 
functioning of expertise within its internal dynamics of evolution. By chance, because of the 
rules of the game of mutual critical assessment, the logic of interests cannot be the only one to 
impose its logic ! 
Using groups of experts to test the acceptability of options is not an easy task for at 
least two reasons : a) in most cases, this borderline is not well-defined ex ante,16 but will 
result as an end-product of the process of expertise and negotiations organised around it ; 
b) each party wants to know more about the others but does not necessarily want its ultimate 
positions being made transparent to others too early. So we have to expect some dissimulation 
and tactics in this game of expertise, as regards exchange of information. The picture that 
some parties may think to have obtained about others may be ultimately revealed quite wrong 
when the expertise phase will have given the way to direct political negotiations. This is the 
                                                 
16.- This relative indeterminacy of interests is a critical feature of the context of controversial risks. Because 
several alternative possibilities exist about basic facts and causal relationships, due to this state of knowledge, 
actors are not able to define and optimise their own interests as regards the specific issue and consequently to 
defend them in negotiations. Consequently the scene is invaded by what we called "secondary interests" and 
strategic actions connected to other types of issues, which also involve conflicts and negotiations for rule-setting : 
for instance, achieving a structural change of the pattern of relationship between the North and the South 
countries, improving economic competitiveness of some industrial sectors, upgrading one's rank in diplomatic 
influence, etc. On this, see Godard (1992c). 
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political advantage of an approach of international co-ordination through scientific expertise : 
it preserves the political autonomy of governments and avoids premature commitment.17 
 
Preparing an imputation of responsibility 
An important part of the activity of experts is devoted, not to explore and synthesise 
results of basic research, but to look for and organise data needed to prepare operations of 
imputation of liabilities supposed to be involved in the emergence of a problem. For example, 
much effort is being done for achieving inventories according to standardised methodologies. 
In the climate change issue, most critical data in the literature take the form of present and 
possible emissions of GHGs per country and, for each country, per inhabitant. These most 
simple ratios (one American citizen emits 6 ton of carbon yearly and one French 1,8 ton only) 
are easy to sell to the public opinion and serve as implicit normative benchmarks for imputing 
responsibility, before any explicit political or legal judgement is made. They have clearly no 
scientific interest, adding nothing to the understanding of basic processes of climatic changes. 
This pre-framing of responsibilities is very ambiguous. It fits to a period where fixing 
new legal rules is at stake. So this treatment of information tends to structure the points on 
which new rules are going to be defined. As such, it contributes to enhance the process. At the 
same time, it is not sure that this pre-judgement of liabilities responds to validated principles 
of justice. There is a chance that some standard, having all appearances of fairness and justice, 
but only these appearances, will gain an attractive strength because of its general diffusion 
among experts, social actors and public opinion.18 
 
Structuring data so as to authorise a rationalisation of decision-making 
Rational decision-making, whatever meaning we give to this expression, involves 
making comparisons (of factors, impacts, options), defining equivalence relationships, setting 
hierarchies (of factors and problems), and producing assessments according to some scales of 
value. These operations need specific operators and formats to shape data into a useful form. 
To this regard, issues of defining appropriate indicators and methodological standards are 
                                                 
17.- One typical example coming from the global warming case is the following : although US experts have 
repeatedly expressed a strong preference for an international tradable permits system for carbon emissions and 
sinks at IPCC and OECD expert meetings devoted to the climate change issue, the US government provoked a 
big surprise in 1991 when, during the negotiations developed within the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, it dismissed this approach as completely 
unrealistic. 
18.- We have tried in another article (Godard, 1992a) to show why none of the main criteria proposed to achieve 
an initial international allocation of permits to emit GHGs (per capita, GNP, present emissions) can be said 
unambiguously to be fair and just. They belong to different justification orders, each criterion expressing at the 
same time what is just and realistic within one of these orders. But there are no general agreement on which order 
should take precedence to arbitrate the climate case. 
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quite ordinary ones. All these operations have to be achieved or validated by groups of 
experts. But, in uncertain and controversial contexts, this necessary step is hard to achieve and 
is a moment of subtle interference of social or ideological inputs within the process of 
producing what is said to be hard and objective facts and data. 
So, in the climate change case, two steps were required to establish a perfect rational 
framework for decision-making : a) to find a common unit for measuring all the costs ; b) to 
find a general index of equivalence between all types of actions as regards their incidence on 
warming. With these two elements, it would be possible to set a complete classification of 
mitigation and adaptation strategies and to optimise the choice of one of them on the basis of a 
cost-effectiveness ratio. This programme is not at hand from the very beginning. 
A first step that IPCC has tried to make in that direction is to elaborate one index 
setting equivalencies between the various GHGs (CO2, CH4, CFCs, N2O, ...). In its 1990's 
report, IPCC gives such an index for all the relevant substances, the Global Warming 
Potential Index (GWPI). To the extent that all gases do not have the same lifetime, these 
equivalencies have been set for two time-periods : 20 years and a 100 years. These values 
have been used for numerous calculations made by experts, official bodies and academic 
researchers to establish a classification of emission sources and possible actions, and to give a 
picture of respective responsibilities of countries. As a matter of fact, this index has been 
exposed to hard criticism which reveals the gap between the real state of knowledge and the 
type of information that should be provided to authorise decision-makers to be fully rational. 
There were many sources of difficulties with this index : 
• important margins of error due to the fact that indirect effects were voluntarily not taken 
into account because of deficiencies of basic knowledge ; 
• a mutual dependence of the values that should be included for one gas on the 
concentration of others, which render an Index practically intractable since each unit value 
should be substituted by a multi-factorial function or a vector ; 
• an instability of the values for each gas as regards the progress of the understanding of the 
climate machinery. 
Let us give an example for the last point. In the 1990's report, CFCs were classed as 
the gas having the highest potential (7.000 times more for CFC12 than for CO2). Two years 
after, the integration of indirect effects of CFCs, including destruction of stratospheric 
ozone,19 has led to a cut of their estimated net potential impact by 80% (Wigley & Raper, 
1992). 
                                                 
19.- If the ozone layer has a useful role in protecting the earth against solar radiation, it is at the same time 
contributing to the greenhouse effect. If CFCs are powerful GHGs, their impact is reduced through the 
destruction of ozone they achieve. 
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The final word of this story has been a situation of emerging distrust of social actors 
against scientists ; scientists have felt this result as particularly frustrating since they 
committed themselves to elaborate this Index with much reluctance, only to answer a demand 
from policy-makers. For many scientists, this Index was not "scientific" at all, because of all 
the holes and shortcomings in the basic understanding of climate that were artificially veiled 
and because it has not got any scientific use. 
In spite of the fact that IPCC said, in its updating of 1992, that it refuses to take into 
account indirect effects in its new values and that 1990 values were suffering from a 
substantial margin of error, subsequent proposals to organise an international regime of 
regulation of GHGs still continue to refer to the GWPI as a basis of calculations, particularly 
in proposals to establish an international tradable permits system or its preliminary stage, 
"joint implementation".20 To some extent, this persistence proves the critical benefits expected 
from simple conventions as co-ordinating devices, even if these conventions are perceived as 
somewhat arbitrary. But it is understandable that all parties will not agree easily on these 
conventions shown to be arbitrary but having important distributive consequences.21 
 
Artificially solidifying an uncertain knowledge through inter-disciplinary and multi-
circles dissemination 
Groups of experts have generally a pluridisciplinary composition and experts have 
various professional origins (university, industrial firms, administration, ONGs). Such a 
mixture is inescapable as regards environmental and health risks which are transversal to the 
capabilities of disciplines and the types of knowledge to mobilise. But this very fact has a 
singular unexpected consequence, that of artificially solidifying pieces of knowledge : unless 
he is in a systematic critical mood,22 the more an expert is distant from one speciality, the 
more he tends to consider statements and results coming from this distant speciality as a solid 
fact, whereas a member of the speciality generally acknowledges all the qualifications that 
should be added to set the exact validity of a statement and all the doubts and uncertainties 
which persist. As a result, as Brian Wynne (1996) put it : "The doubts and uncertainties of 
core specialists are diminished by the overlaps and interpenetrations with adjacent 
disciplines. Given that all technologies and environmental policies require knowledge to be 
                                                 
20.- See for example the proposal of Tom Jones, from the OECD's Environment Directorate, at the International 
Conference organised by OECD and IEA on the economics of climate change (Jones, 1994). 
21.- The already mentioned controversy between Indian researchers of CSE and fellows of WRI about 
calculations of net emissions per country is typical of this difficulty. As regards IPCC, see also J.K. Parikh's 
discussion of the ingredients of the reference scenario for calculating future emissions (1992) and S. Boehmer-
Christiansen (1994a & b) for the whole process. 
22 .- This may happen when specialists from one discipline are distrustful as regards the scientific value of any 
contribution from some other disciplines ; rightly or wrongly, ecological sciences often suffered from such a 
systematic distrust. 
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synthesised from several or many more specialities, the net result is a more secure collective 
belief in the policy knowledge, or the technology, than one might have obtained from any one 
of the separate contributing specialities". 
This mechanism can be ascertained by the reading of much economics or political 
science literature about climate change. Though uncertainties may be acknowledged and 
stressed in some cases,23 some basic structures or features are often taken for granted and 
well-founded to a higher degree by adjacent scientists or non-scientists having a scientific 
background than by people belonging to the speciality. Many illustrations may be given. One 
evident process of this type has been the focus on CO2 in most part of economic literature as 
if it was the unique GHG of interest. This reduction of issues has been facilitated by the GWPI 
giving equivalence rates between various GHGs in terms of CO2-equivalent. But it may have 
some side effects when talking about the actions to be taken : a) the artefact of talking 
uniquely of CO2 may induce an excessive focus of action on this gas ; b) it may give an 
excessive credit to the idea that the global warming case is a pure global one, i.e. regional 
climate changes will be insensitive to the location of emission sources.24 I will give two more 
representative examples. 
The first one is the beginning of a recent paper by Edward Parson and Owen Greene 
(1995) about the ozone layer : "In the mid-1970s, atmospheric scientists discovered that the 
stratospheric ozone layer, which protects the earth from a certain type of ultraviolet radiation 
that is harmful to life, was being depleted by chemicals introduced into the atmosphere by 
human activities. (...) In response to the threat to the ozone layer, countries around the world 
have entered into agreements to phase out the use of harmful substances". In fact, the real 
story was not that one. The initial event was not a discovery, which implies some empirical 
test, but the publication of a theoretical model by Rowland and Molina in 1974. Regulation 
has been prepared in the USA well before any practical evidence confirm the connection 
between CFCs and variations of the ozone layer (Wuttke, 1994). The Montreal Protocol, this 
major international agreement, has been signed a few weeks before, and not after, a first 
empirical confirmation has been obtained in the Antarctic zone (Warr, 1990). Still today, 
although CFCs' phasing out has been advanced twice, the connection between the Antarctic 
situation and the evolution of the ozone layer world-wide is not clear. 
Another example can be taken from the field of economics. Two American 
economists, Alan Manne and Richard Richels, whose work is supported by the Electric Power 
                                                 
23.- See the expressive titles of articles by L. Lave (1991) : "Formulating greenhouse policies in a sea of 
uncertainty" or E.W. Colglazier (1991) : "Scientific uncertainties, public policy, and global warming : how sure 
is sure enough ?" 
24 .- The discovery of the role of aerosols delivers another picture, since aerosols are regionally stable within the 
atmosphere : it gives a critical influence to the location of emissions. The future relevance of international joint 
implementation or schemes of tradable permits should have to be reassessed. 
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Research Institute (EPRI), have had a prominent influence on the international expertise scene 
about the global warming case. They specifically have been told to have influenced the US 
government's position against premature action, because of the high economic cost of any 
serious action on carbon sources in the USA, but favouring big investment in research. In 
February 1992, they released a draft paper analysing the EC proposal for introducing a 
combined carbon and energy tax25 and its implications for the USA if the US government 
comes to use the same sort of instrument. This draft has been immediately echoed in the press, 
notably in the New-York Times. After the draft has been submitted to peer review, it has been 
published in January 1993 into the academic journal Energy Policy published by Butterworth-
Heinemann. We suggest to look at these three steps with some detail. 
 
First step : the draft paper released in February 1992 
Using their Global 2100 model, these authors came to several conclusions in this draft, 
the two major ones being that the EC proposal may not be sufficient to accomplish the 
stated objective of reducing emissions below current levels, and that a tax on nuclear 
will only add to the difficulties of achieving the target by reducing incentives to use 
carbon-free sources of energy. But they also compare the respective impacts on the USA 
and EC economies and conclude that the cost for the USA economy will be 50 % higher 
in GDP percentage than the cost for the EC economy, because Western Europe uses 
approximately 40 % less energy per unit of economic output. They show the Figure 9 
reproduced below and add (p. 15) : "To the extent that a lower energy/GDP ratio 
reflects lower energy use by industry, there may be implications for international 
competitiveness." They had taken the precaution to acknowledge, in a section called 
"Assumptions", that : "As with any analysis, the results are largely determined by a 
handful of critical assumptions". 
Second step : a translation given by a newspaper article 
In the New York Times dated February 26, 1992, Peter Passell echoed the criticism 
against an energy tax, as "adding cost while actually reducing the net impact", but also 
the idea that the cost will be higher for the USA than for Europe in the following terms : 
"The United States uses more energy per dollar of output than Europe. Thus it should 
not be surprising that the Manne-Richels simulation shows that a broad-based energy 
tax would be even more expensive in America than in Europe. And while the broad tax 
might serve the parallel function of blurring the impact on regions and industries, the 
fact that Europe would end-up with an overall economic advantage would surely 
                                                 
25.- For a political science analysis of this EC project of combined energy and carbon tax, see A. Liberatore 
(1995). For a synthesis of its possible economic impact and use in France, see O. Godard & O. Beaumais (1994). 
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depreciate its political currency in the United States". So the public expression of the 
academic work of Manne and Richels refers to "the fact that Europe would end up with 
an overall economic advantage" in its competition with the USA, a statement which is 
not the one of the authors, but is not contradictory to what they say, and seems to 
respond to a largely shared belief in the USA. 
Third step : the academic release in Energy Policy 
When the Manne and Richels' paper has been published in 1993, it demonstrated no 
significant difference with the draft, but for one section : the question of the relative cost 
to EC and USA. An entirely new argument has been introduced about the calculation of 
dead-weight loss cost of a new tax when existing prices of commodities are already 
taxed. This point was ignored in the model simulations whose results were given in the 
draft. This addition resulted from peer discussions and notably from results of papers by 
OECD economists Peter Hoeller and Jonathan Coppel (1992). Without mentioning their 
previous results already disseminated, Manne and Richels are now explaining that 
"when measured in terms of economy-wide costs, the EC proposal is likely to have an 
even larger impact on Western Europe than on the USA. (...) the additional tax 
distortions would be considerably greater than those in the USA. (...) We estimate that 
the average cost (as a percentage of GDP) would be nearly three times as high in 
Western Europe as in the USA" (p. 9 & 10). They show what is now Figure 10 
reproduced below. The two figures depict a completely opposite reality as regards which 
region would bear the highest cost. 
The storytelling could be continued, because this issue of differences in existing 
taxation schemes and assessment of dead-weight losses has been intensively discussed since 
1992 ;26 this discussion gave birth to a new debate about possible fiscal reforms ensuring 
"revenue neutrality" and alleviating the most distortionary taxes or charges, such as those 
based on employment : what should be taken into account is a net distortionary cost of a 
global reform including a new carbon tax and not only the gross additional distortionary cost 
associated to the specific carbon tax (Godard, 1993a). 
Other cases of this sort have been documented in other fields, showing the possible 
drawbacks produced by a confusion between reality and results obtained from scientific 
models. Brian Wynne (1992) has shown for instance how, in the nuclear case in Great Britain, 
expert groups have stated very wrong predictions about the time-period needed to obtain a 
stabilisation of radiocaesium in the ground in some areas (three weeks estimated ; more than 
six year maintained under ban in fact), because of their application of one model of soil 
behaviour to a type of soil which were not of the same type as the original case. 
                                                 
26.- See the review of P. Ekins (1995). 
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1. The figure extracted from the Manne and Richels' draft of February 1992 
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2. The figure extracted from the Energy Policy paper in January 1993 
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We may get some lessons from these sorts of cases : 
• Specialised scientists do know that their results are contingent results from models, 
depend on "a handful of critical assumptions", and are not a direct expression of reality. 
So, it is quite evident for them that changing assumptions and adding new variables will 
change the results. They do not see in this change of results a threat for their credibility, 
inasmuch this is not just a change in "opinion". 
• When placed in position of experts, scientists are listened to as if they were talking of 
reality, not of contingent results and constructs. Even if they do not personally express 
themselves this way, what they write and disseminate is interpreted as such. All the 
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qualifications about assumptions and specific methods are forgot. So, the circulation of 
scientific results in circles larger than the original speciality generates an ossification of 
contingent statements into illusory "hard facts". When some scientific statements are in 
accordance with pre-existing beliefs, they are still more easily selected, by non-specialists, 
as true and direct expressions of reality . 
• The value of collective expertise should not mainly be placed in the quality of specific 
results at one moment, but in the open process of informed debate among specialists, with 
feedback to research. Such a process is itself very valuable, not because it can 
progressively lead to some consensus - it may on some points, but it may not on others- 
but because the key issues and variables are made apparent through the debate. Helping to 
pose the right questions and to give a good framing to a fuzzy set of issues is what groups 
of experts and open debates can best do. All this needs some time - several years - and 
may be contradictory to the want of policy-makers to get clear-cut advice within a short 
period. 
These lessons give us a good transition with the next section, since they may be seen 
as the basis of some precautionary rules to manage expertise. 
 
3. On the Precautionary Principle 
What is called the Precautionary Principle is the idea27 that taking regulatory measures 
to prevent some possible risks may be legitimate even when strong scientific evidence on 
causal relationships or the extent of the damage is missing. Nowadays, this Principle is often 
said to be the solid foundation on which to base decision-making under uncertainty. For 
example James Cameron and Will Wade-Gery (1995, p. 95) state that : "The precautionary 
principle provides the philosophical authority to take decisions in the face of uncertainty" and 
see it as a "general principle of international environmental law".28 No doubt that, at first 
sight, this principle may be viewed as an interesting advancement, bringing some practical 
responses appropriate to the context of scientific uncertainty and controversy we are 
considering here. But analysis is required before reaching definite conclusions. In particular, it 
is useful to think about the new course it may introduce in the relationship between science 
and decision. 
 
                                                 
27.- There is no unique definition of the Precautionary Principle. This is the reason why we refer just to "the 
idea". 
28.- We have been told by lawyers that a specific feature of international law is that it is not framed by general 
principles but by a network of specific conventions... General principles only belong to soft law. 
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A paradoxical position as regards science 
The precautionary principle is just placed at the articulation of a logic of extension of 
rational knowledge, and of an institutionalisation of the acknowledgement of the possible 
intrinsic limitation of scientific knowledge to provide for the appropriate information in due 
time. This is not an easy position. Still more science in one side, but a distance, if not a 
distrust, introduced regarding its results ! This position leads to contradictory requirements. 
On one side, dependence on science is maintained. Implementing the Principle entails 
a minimum scientific qualification of risks : the precautionary approach can do nothing for 
risks that are not even represented. To be credible, this minimum representation should pass 
the test of scientific research, either to validate the possibility of the risks, or because the very 
initial idea about the risks is a result of a scientific programme. 
Scientists are also asked to develop new knowledge about possible risks, with an 
exploration of numerous virtual possibilities. As a matter of fact, one of the new obligations 
generated by the Principle is an obligation for decision-makers to search information and do 
additional research about potential risks that have been identified already. 
On the other side, scientists are asked to raise their self-consciousness about the 
limitations of their scientific constructs and to open their professional activity to a wider 
social criticism. 
Moreover, the Principle introduces a distance between the decision-making process 
and scientific results and proofs : it is no more required to wait for the latter before deciding 
what and when to do. This change is sometimes interpreted as a means to restore the primacy 
of a political framing of issues and political assessment of the opportunity to take action 
(Cameron and Wade-Gery, 1995). We can accept this statement only to some extent, because 
of the new social power given to the scientific community : scientists are going to be given the 
power to influence social games and rule-setting processes through the apparently benign 
activity of producing assumptions and imagining virtual worlds. 
If, as it is suggested by analysts coming from the insurance circles,29 the Precautionary 
Principle should come to a restoration of fault as a basis for civil responsibility,30 this new 
power will have counterparts for scientists in terms of new responsibilities. In the past, 
scientists were responsible before their colleagues for their results, i.e. to claim having made a 
discovery or a new enhancement, a scientist had, and still has, to bring the proof and exposes 
                                                 
29. On this, see the argument of F. Ewald (1993) in favour of a strict distinction between "normal risks" and 
"development risk" and his plea for exonerating "development risk" from any civil responsibility. For an opposite 
viewpoint, attached to a general implementation of the principle of "objective responsibility", see G. Martin 
(1996). 
30.- Responsibility will be involved if it can be shown than the party at the origin of a materialised damage has 
not taken the precautionary measures that should have been taken on the basis of the current state of knowledge 
(including conjectures and unproved causal chains), and will not be in the opposite case. 
O. Godard - Scientific controversy, expertise and precaution -  - 28 - 
his activity to the judgement of other scientists. Now, by formulating statements about new 
uncertain possibilities, scientists may alter industrial activities, through triggering new 
regulatory constraints, and more generally change the balance of costs and benefits of many 
technological options. This may have two types of effects : 
• To exonerate their own responsibility towards society, scientists will tend to over multiply 
the identification of possibilities which may be the outcome of a situation or a project, 
leading to a mass of information that will be very difficult to organise and to use. As a 
consequence, there will be a profusion of risks of all sorts that decision-makers should 
take into account. At the same time, scientists will be much more cautious before saying 
something is "certain". The most usual response they will give is : that's possible but we 
are not sure. In particular they will accept with difficulty to say that a substance or a 
technology are certified to be safe and will absolutely create no damage to human health 
or the environment.31 They will add : "on the basis of current knowledge".  
• Through the process of adoption of assumptions and definition of programmes of research, 
current scientific activities are pointing new possible risks. This very fact will presumably 
have direct consequences in the economic sphere. So economic agents may begin to attack 
the responsibility of scientists when ex-post assessment indicates they have expressed an 
inadequate judgement - for instance, when a substance has been told to be possibly toxic, 
then provoking a regulation, in a case where this possibility turned out not to be 
confirmed. 
To some extent, courts are going to be made judges of what "the current state of 
knowledge" is, and will interfere with the scientific process.32 One thing appears quite sure : if 
such processes are developing, it will become more and more difficult to be a researcher ! 
This new power of "making the games" which may be given to scientific activities and 
statements is much more vulnerable to attempts of strategic instrumentalisation by various 
types of actors than the usual scientific results. This is so, because only results can be placed 
under the systematic methodological scrutiny of the scientific community (classically, results 
have to be shown reproducible, for instance), and assumptions cannot follow the same way : 
to plainly validate an assumption is to get a certified result ! In controversial contexts, we 
have seen that various social interests tried to displace their social competition into the field of 
scientific constructions of the world, in order to shape the vision of the world that will be 
                                                 
31.- We have to recall that for years, CFCs were considered as the best example of an environmentally-friendly 
product, because of its stability.  
32 .- A recent case in Greece illustrates the point : judicial authorities of this country have launched a criminal 
inquiry against the Public Body for Seismic Protection for not having taken into account the alarm released by a 
university team of physicists about a coming earthquake. As a matter of fact, such an earthquake did happen in 
June 1995, with several persons being killed or injured. But the methodology sustaining the forecast was still 
highly controversial among specialised scientists (Kuntz, 1995). 
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socially disseminated. This process will tend, in the future, to be facilitated, and not reduced, 
by the Precautionary Principle, unless precise interpretative rules are set to give it appropriate 
procedural delimitation. 
Though required they may be to define benchmarks and guidelines, such procedural 
rules will necessary adjust the social process of decision-making to the scientific life. 
Specifically, it will be necessary to define various degrees of precautionary response 
according to various degrees of seriousness of the evidence showing there could be risks. All 
this will reinforce the dependence of society on scientific judgements and on the internal 
functioning of the scientific community. The possible counteraction is that more and more 
citizens take an eye on scientific life. 
It is difficult to predict what will be the balance between the two tendencies, contained 
in the Precautionary Principle, one of reinforcing the dependence of collective decision-
making on science, the other of marking a distrust leading to a limitation of science to a minor 
role. We may imagine some rocking movement of society between these positions. We may 
also imagine some entangled situation, having both at the same time : science imposing its 
rhythm and agenda to society, identifying targets or scapegoats, and society being caught by a 
general distrust towards any scientific positive statement, but giving credit to all the threats. It 
is not sure that such a realm of fear will be a safe society. 
 
Shifting the burden of proof : the missing content of the Precautionary Principle 
To many observers (Cameron & Wade-Gery, 1995 ; Garcia, 1994 ; Wynne, 1992, 
1996), one of the practical incidence of the Principle is to shift or revert the burden of proof : 
it will be no more the people complaining about damage that will have to bring the proof 
before a regulation is taken, but those who propose a new project or a new technology should 
have to bring the proof that there will be no damage, before they can be authorised. This 
seems to be the best possible principle in the best world ! Reality is not that simple. We will 
advance three points converging to the practical unfeasibility of a straight application of this 
reversion of the burden of proof. 
As Brian Wynne (1992, 1996) rightly points, if the Precautionary Principle only means 
a shifting in the burden of proof, it will continue to support the same old ideology of positivist 
science in which science is credited with the capacity to reduce any possible uncertainty 
through more and more research. On the contrary, Wynne proposes to look at part of the so-
called uncertainty as a basic indeterminacy of risks and of scientific statements related to 
them. If the Principle is adhered to without any afterthought or strategic aim of 
instrumentalisation, reverting the burden of proof can be said to be a self-contradictory 
component : we have seen that the Principle is the expression of a new consciousness of the 
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limitations of science, as regards many issues, in bringing decisive results that will have a 
predictive value. But, if this position is to be taken seriously, it should also be realised that, if 
science is not able to proof the causal relationship leading to a possible damage, 
symmetrically it may also be unable to divert the possibility of its existence. In other terms, 
requiring the proof of the absence of damage is asking for something science is not able to 
give in the controversial context we are considering. 
If this requirement is supposed to be applied literally, it can only lead to a general 
prohibition of most significant activities. The very high cost that may result from this position 
will be judged unacceptable by the population if information on these costs is made available 
to them. So, presumably, it is through the untold dictatorship of small groups that this extreme 
interpretation of the Principle could impose its realm. As a general phenomenon, its 
probability is rather low, but it is not improbable that, in some cases in which the public 
opinion does not perceive the costs of blocking development and there are some very 
motivated groups of interests investing this cause, public authorities may prefer to give up in 
order to avoid conflicts. 
So, asking for the proof of harmlessness cannot be but a rhetorical argument in a 
political game, an argument that will be used depending on the political projects and fights.33 
This is this way than we can say the Principle restores a political logic on a scientific one. 
The second point concerns the idea of "worse-case planning". This idea will be 
difficult to implement, because of practical deficiencies. The definition of the "worse-case" is 
depending of the imagination of scenario-builders. It is an open-ended exercise which has to 
be stopped by some extra-scientific conventions, and quite materialistically, through the effect 
of economic constraints (cost of modelling, of field work, and so on). Even if this first 
obstacle could be overcome, a second one is challenging : as regards controversial risks on 
which no scientific consensus exists, the worse case scenario of the various options tend to be 
equally catastrophic or negative. So, to refer to the worse-case as a benchmark is not enough 
discriminating to be useful for decision-making. This practical deficiency can only be avoided 
if some extra-scientific criterion defines the boundaries of the scenarios to consider or if an 
implicit asymmetry is accepted in the treatment of options.34 
                                                 
33.- One example extracted from the recent controversy about the French nuclear underground experiments is 
offered by Jim Bolger, Prime Minister of New Zealand, in an article published in Le Monde, in September 1995. 
He argues that "La région court le risque d'être atteinte en cas d'accident, ce que personne ne peut 
catégoriquement exclure, quelles que soient les précautions prises. Aucun scientifique n'a jamais démontré d'une 
façon convaincante qu'il n'y aura aucune fuite radioactive en mer." This is quite true : a scientist will never be 
able to offer such a guarantee, in that case as in numerous other cases. But, so what ? Where is the threshold of 
acceptable risks ? Zero risk in any case ? 
34.- A key issue to this regards is the process through which the public attention is focusing on one issue 
(Amazonia, ozone layer,...), forgetting other types of risks which rationally deserve the same sort of attention. 
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The third point continues with the same idea. Generally speaking, the framing of 
choices is not one risky option against a safe one ; more than often, it is a risky option against 
one another. We have to deal with contexts with all-pervasive risks, including economic and 
political risks. This is not to say that one risk is equivalent to any other one, but to stress that 
the general function of public policy-makers is to arbitrate between risks just as they have to 
arbitrate between various types of public interests. It will not be an easy task to set an order on 
all these risks and, since they belong to different parts of reality placed under scientific 
controversies, this ordering will not ultimately result from a scientific judgement but from a 
political one. What is called the general interest is the result of such an arbitration process. It 
is very infrequent that some interest - here a possible environmental or health damage - has 
such an importance that it should take the precedence on any other legitimate interest. And it 
is still more infrequent that the same interest keeps this position through time. So, 
precautionary attitudes as regards the environment will have to be arbitrated with other types 
of legitimate interests, and arbitration solutions will evolve. 
In spite of efforts to stabilise one definition of the Precautionary Principle, this 
Principle is marked by one significant hesitation unwillingly attested by an effort of James 
Cameron and Will Wade-Gery (1995, p. 100) to fix up the conceptual core of the Principle. 
After having said that "A lack of certainty about cause and effect relationships, or the extent 
of possible environmental harm, does not legitimate delaying the imposition of some kind of 
regulatory mechanism over the activity in question", they express what they think to be the 
core : "The precautionary principle stipulates that where the environmental risks being run by 
regulatory inaction are in some way (a) uncertain but (b) non negligible, regulatory inaction 
is unjustified." These two sentences are not saying the same thing : the first one only says that 
a lack of certainty does not legitimate delaying action. But it does not say that immediate 
action is systematically required. This action has to be legitimated for its own sake. So, with 
this understanding, the principle is open to a public and rational debate about the opportunity 
to act. As regards the second sentence, the features of uncertainty and non-negligibility are 
supposed to be sufficient to require immediate action, since inaction is judged unjustified. 
And, implicitly, this action seems to be a refusal to authorise a project, or a ban on a 
substance. There is a logical shortcomings here, one that illustrates a frequent twist of 
statements, which begin by evoking the legitimate right to act without certainty and finish by 
saying that immediate regulatory action is an obligation. We should notice that the often-
quoted North Sea Ministerial Declaration of November 1987 only refers to the idea that "a 
precautionary approach may require action (...)".35 Viewing a precautionary action only as a 
legitimate possibility which needs to pass additional assessment before being translated into 
action is more in accordance with our conceptions of decision-making processes under 
                                                 
35.- Underlined by us. 
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scientific controversy : the social body has to be let to make value judgements on how to 
interpret the Principle. 
 
Conclusion 
We first tried to characterise contexts of decision-making under scientific controversy, 
which gives a prominent role to the social process of construction of issues. Then, we have 
shown that the pressure to act leads at one moment to some new regime, generally based on 
some technological options : since the scientific controversy cannot be solved by itself, 
technological conventions and social acceptability of options come to an indirect arbitration 
among competing scientific views. This way to tackle the issue has a direct consequence on 
the process of expertise. To this regard we have stressed in section 2 the specific, but often 
implicit, roles of expertise. The main concept is that expertise is an "investment in forms", 
framing information into the forms required for action. This does not go without 
misunderstandings and mistakes that appear when results of scientific constructions are 
perceived as direct expressions of reality. 
Among the conventions which result from the work of experts and at the same time 
frame the course of relationship between science and decision-making regarding 
environmental issues, the Precautionary Principle has emerged as a leading one, together with 
the sustainable development concept (Godard, 1994). It may authorise a new equilibration of 
public decision-making in favour of environmental and health protection. But it may also get 
hazardous results, because the Principle gives birth to an open-ended process, whose closure 
will not come from science. It may particularly give birth to important side-effects in changing 
the course of relationship between science and decision-making : it may place society into a 
new dependence on a rather contingent dynamics of assumptions within research activities, 
and at the same time load the research activity with a new weight of responsibility and social 
interference, contradictory to the classical academic freedom for searching and testing new 
ideas. There is some chance that, turned into illusory statements and rhetoric, the Principle 
will contribute here and there to a degeneracy of the quality of decision-making. Another 
likely risk is that the Principle will cover the dominance of some implicit doctrine responding 
to an epistemic community disseminating its "vision of the world and society" far from any 
truly scientific and democratic control. 
Since the content of the Precautionary Principle is either not well-defined, or 
unacceptable in its most extreme version, solutions should be searched not in the idea of 
reverting the burden of proof, but in organising the conditions of expertise, so as to adapt and 
protect at the same time the scientific activity against the new social risks to which it will be 
exposed. The point is to learn how to reconcile two different goals : to organise an open 
discussion among specialised scientists, and to limit the possibility of a strategic 
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instrumentalisation of scientific works and conceptions. The media are not the central place 
for achieving an arbitration of scientific controversies, even if such controversies are not to be 
hidden. But the media are the place to amplify and multiply the socio-political debate on 
priorities, criteria, thresholds of acceptability and so on.36 For such a debate to take place in 
good conditions, it should have been made clear that science may never give certainty on 
some issues, but a zero risk approach will be irrational and self-defeating, i.e. impossible. 
Scientific communities could profitably develop their own collective structure in order 
to provide an expertise which will not depend excessively on individual strategies or desires, 
or on administrative command and political selection. In particular, new mechanisms should 
be developped as regards the treatment of assumptions and the construction of possible 
worlds, in order to find a casuistic permitting to discriminate between possibilities and 
assumptions categorised as negligible from the viewpoint of regulatory action and those for 
which some initial precautionary steps should be taken. This collective expertise, expressed in 
forms analogous to reports of the Academy of sciences, should specify a gradual scaling of the 
state of knowledge about one issue, up to the point where there is "sufficient evidence" to 
recommend a strict application of the Precautionary Principle. From a law viewpoint, different 
obligations should be set at successive degrees on the scale of knowledge : at initial degrees, 
action will be limited to an obligation of developing information (research on marginal 
assumptions, data collection, experiments); at further degrees, there may be guidelines and 
information disseminated in the direction of the concerned people, without any regulatory 
constraints. The latter may be considered at the subsequent degrees and so on. 
This approach of collective expertise should not be confused with basic research itself, 
since its work would be centred on implications of science in terms of social action and 
commitment, with all the roles of expertise we have identify in section 2. At the same time, 
this collective intermediation may insure an adequate protection of individual researchers 
against possible engagement of their civil responsibility. 
The general concept supporting these suggestions is to differentiate the scenes and 
roles, and preferably to avoid a general confusion of stakeholders and scientists within some 
global forum in charge of saying the truth and prosecuting science at the same time.  
Within this perspective, precautionary action is not supposed to support a definitive 
commitment or prohibition, but presumably a transitory one. Since the real limits of nature are 
unknown, our regulatory measures should be looked at as experiments which have to be 
controlled and analysed, as it is done for scientific experiments in order to improve our 
                                                 
36.- For instance, in the case of carcinogenic toxic products, the controversy about the very existence of a 
threshold of complete safety, makes it impossible to define standards calculated on the basis of a science-defined 
threshold. J.-P. Moatti (1989, 1991) explains how, in that case, economic analyses may be use for developing a 
social debate on the acceptable levels of risks and establish some procedures to avoid large incoherence in public 
action.  
O. Godard - Scientific controversy, expertise and precaution -  - 34 - 
knowledge. Then, we have to organise the regulatory measures so as to be able to welcome 
future progress in knowledge. This means maintaining a sufficient reversibility of rules. 
Management of the timing of regulatory action is a key issue37 to this regard, as we pointed in 
section 1. If a regulatory process in one domain has a long history that proves that it has 
systematically come too late to the decision and implementation stages, invoking the 
Precautionary Principle may add to the strategic resources needed to speed-up the process and 
overcome all strategies of delaying action in this domain. In other cases, it will be wise not to 
take premature measures, because the possible irreversible damage costs borne by Nature are 
not the only irreversible costs to consider. 
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